


1 codes according to Ameritech's proposed language, it would be
2 impossible for Level 3 (or any other CLEC in a similar situation) to utilize
3 virtual NXXs in the provision of service to its customers. Virtual NXXs are
4 often used by carriers to provide a local number to customers in local
5 calling areas in which the customer is not physically located. Customers
6 who are physically located (both ILEC and CLEC customers) in that area
7 are then able to place calls to the virtual NXX customer without incurring
8 toll charges. If Ameritech precludes Level 3 or any other CLEC from
9 providing virtual NXXs, not only would Ameritech customers no longer be
10 able to reach many of their ISPs by dialing a local number, but because
11 calls to the ISP have been re-classified as toll calls, Ameritech would no
12 longer be obligated to pay the reciprocal compensation associated with
13 local calls.

14
15 **Q. DO THE COSTS INCURRED BY AMERITECH DIFFER WHEN ONE OF**
16 **ITS CUSTOMERS DIALS A VIRTUAL NXX NUMBER, THEREBY**
17 **PROVIDING JUSTIFICATION FOR AMERITECH TO RESTRICT NXX**
18 **ASSIGNMENT?**

19 **A.** No. There is no additional cost incurred by Ameritech when a virtual NXX
20 is provided to a CLEC customer, because Ameritech carries the call the
21 same distance and incurs the same costs regardless of whether the call is
22 terminated to a CLEC customer with a physical location in the NXX rate
23 center, or a CLEC customer with a virtual NXX. When a customer of

Ameritech originates a call on Ameritech's network, Ameritech's responsibility for the call ends with delivery to the Point of interconnection ("POI") it has established with Level 3 or another CLEC. Once the call is handed off at the POI, the CLEC is responsible for the costs of delivering the call to the terminating number. Ameritech's obligations and costs are exactly the same in delivering the call to the POI, regardless of whether the call terminates at a so-called "virtual" or physical NXX or behind the POI. Ameritech would carry the call the same distance and incur the same transport costs. This concept is illustrated in the diagram below.



As shown in this diagram, Ameritech should be completely indifferent as to where the CLEC terminates the call from both a cost and operational standpoint. As noted above, however, there is an artificial incentive on the part of Ameritech to limit NXX code usage. By restricting NXX assignment, Ameritech would evade its obligation to pay the CLEC for

1 terminating the Ameritech customer's call on the CLEC's network if the
2 CLEC customer was assigned a virtual NXX code. This avoidance of its
3 reciprocal compensation obligation is likely a strong motivating factor for
4 Ameritech to restrict NXX assignment.

5
6 **Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT FOR LEVEL 3 TO PROVIDE ITS CUSTOMERS**
7 **WITH VIRTUAL NXXS?**

8 A. Level 3 and other CLECs provide (and, as discussed below, seemingly
9 Ameritech itself provides) a valuable service to customers by providing
10 them with virtual NXXs. For example, Level 3 may attract ISP customers
11 by providing virtual NXXs. The virtual NXX allows the ISP's subscribers to
12 access the Internet by calling a local number, even though the ISP's POP
13 is miles away.

14
15 A key competitive advantage – indeed, a practical business necessity – for
16 any ISP is having a local dial-up for a prospective customer. Because
17 Internet bound calls are often longer in duration than other calls, avoiding
18 toll charges associated with accessing an ISP's POP that is not located in
19 the user's rate center dramatically reduces the user's Internet costs.
20 Therefore, ISPs will often choose their carrier based on the carrier's ability
21 to provide local dial-up capability.

22

1 **Q. HOW WOULD THE COMPETITIVE DEPLOYMENT OF AFFORDABLE**
2 **ADVANCED SERVICES BE IMPACTED IF AMERITECH RESTRICTS**
3 **THE ASSIGNMENT OF NXX CODES?**

4 A. By contractually restricting the assignment of NXXs in such a manner that
5 Level 3 and other CLECs cannot offer virtual NXXs, the costs associated
6 with accessing the Internet would increase. By allowing for virtual NXX
7 assignments, Level 3 and other CLECs have been able to provide
8 services which allow ISPs to provide low cost advanced services
9 throughout Illinois, by allowing ISP customers to access the internet by
10 dialing a local number. Eliminating the ability to provide virtual NXX codes
11 would be a step in the wrong direction in the deployment of affordable
12 advanced services in Illinois, as the end result would be a decrease in
13 usage of internet services by Illinois citizens facing the prospect of toll
14 charges to access their ISPs.

15
16 This would be in direct conflict with the 1996 Act, which calls for
17 consumers in all regions of the Nation, including those in rural, insular,
18 and high cost areas, to have access to telecommunications and
19 information services at just, reasonable, and comparable rates.

20

21 **Q. WOULD AMERITECH'S PROPOSED LANGUAGE GIVE AMERITECH A**
22 **COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE ISP MARKET?**

1 A. Yes. Ameritech markets certain products to ISPs. Two such products are
2 OmniPresencesm and Ensemblesm. Ameritech's OmniPresencesm and
3 Ensemblesm services allow ISPs to provide their subscribers with directory
4 numbers that allow them to access the Internet with a local phone call,
5 regardless of the location of the ISP's POP, even if the POP is in a
6 different physical location from the Internet user within the LATA.⁵

7 These service offerings appear to be no different from what CLECs such
8 as Level 3 offer their own ISP customers using a virtual NXX arrangement.
9 For example, Ameritech's response to a Level 3 data request (provided as
10 part of TJG Schedule 2) reveals that "[w]ithout Omnipresence, a customer
11 would be required to rent space and place equipment in order to terminate
12 leased lines to multiple physical locations." However, if CLECs are
13 prohibited from offering the virtual NXX arrangement to prospective and
14 current ISP customers through Ameritech's proposed contract restrictions,
15 ISPs would either have to establish multiple POPs in order to allow their
16 subscribers to access the Internet via a local number or to contract with
17 Ameritech and subscribe to OmniPresencesm or Ensemblesm. Because
18 each POP requires a significant investment in hardware and leased line
19 connections, and because provisioning services in new areas may cause
20 delays in ISP service offerings, the ability to offer ISP customers local dial-
21 up and single POP capability is a critical competitive consideration. By

⁵ Attached to my testimony in TJG Schedule 2 are documents from Ameritech's website relating to these service products, and certain responses provided by Ameritech to data requests regarding these products.

1 precluding Level 3 from offering these services, Ameritech is creating an
2 economic barrier to Level 3 providing service to ISPs, and is giving itself a
3 significant competitive advantage. This clear advantage for Ameritech
4 would not only stifle the ability of CLECs such as Level 3 to provide
5 service to ISPs in Illinois, but would essentially eliminate the prospect for
6 competition in this market.

7
8 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION ON DEPLOYMENT OF NXX**
9 **CODES.**

10 A. The use of virtual NXX codes allows consumers efficient access to ISPs
11 and advanced services that would otherwise be impossible if such calls
12 were treated as toll calls. Further, such a restriction on NXX codes would
13 inappropriately allow Ameritech to avoid payment of reciprocal
14 compensation and give Ameritech a competitive advantage over CLECs in
15 the ISP market. For all these reasons, the Commission should adopt
16 Level 3's position and delete Ameritech's proposed language that would
17 restrict NXX code assignment from the interconnection agreement.

18
19 ***Issue 18 – Combinations of UNEs Generally***

20
21 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN LEVEL 3 AND**
22 **AMERITECH CONCERNING ISSUE 18, COMBINATIONS OF**
23 **UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS GENERALLY.**

1 A. Level 3 opposes Ameritech's language with respect to Issue 18 in that
2 such language would have the effect of imposing usage restrictions on
3 Level 3's ability to combine UNEs with other services. Ameritech
4 maintains that ILECs may preclude CLECs from combining UNEs with
5 other ILEC services.

6

7 **Q. IS AMERITECH'S PROPOSED LANGUAGE CONSISTENT WITH THE**
8 **TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996?**

9 A. No. Section 251(c)(3) of the 1996 Act requires ILECs to provide to
10 requesting carriers access to UNEs as follows:

11 Unbundled Access. -- The duty to provide, to any requesting
12 telecommunications carrier for the provision of a
13 telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network
14 elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point
15 on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
16 nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of
17 the agreement and the requirements of this section and section
18 252. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such
19 unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting
20 carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such
21 telecommunications service.⁶
22

23 **Q. THE LAST SENTENCE OF 251(c)(3) IS NOT PRECISE IN ITS**
24 **DIRECTION TO ILECS. HAS THE FCC PROVIDED GUIDANCE**
25 **WITH RESPECT TO THIS SECTION OF THE ACT?**

26 A. Yes. The FCC codified in rule 51.309(a) its view that the plain
27 meaning of Section 251(c)(3) of the 1996 Act does not permit

⁶ 47 U.S.C. Sect. 251(c)(3).

1 unilateral usage restrictions imposed by the incumbents. Specifically,
2 the FCC concluded that an ILEC "shall not impose limitations,
3 restriction, or requirements on requests for, or the use of, unbundled
4 network elements that would impair the ability of a requesting
5 telecommunications carrier to offer a telecommunications service in
6 the manner the requesting carrier intends."⁷

7
8 To my knowledge, Rule 51.319(a) was not challenged in court by
9 Ameritech or any other Party.

10
11 **Q. DOES THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY AMERITECH WITH RESPECT**
12 **TO COMBINING UNES WITH OTHER SERVICES IMPAIR LEVEL 3'S**
13 **ABILITY TO OFFER SERVICES IN THE MANNER LEVEL 3 INTENDS?**

14 A. Yes. The language proposed by Ameritech with respect to Issue 18 would
15 impose unjustified usage restrictions on Level 3's ability to combine
16 unbundled network elements with other services. The broad proposed
17 language in Appendix UNE 2.9.8 is obviously intended to impede Level 3
18 from offering vigorous competition in the local exchange market in Illinois
19 since it would eliminate the ability of Level 3 connect UNEs to or combine
20 UNEs with many Ameritech access services and other Ameritech tariffed
21 service offerings.

22

⁷ 47 C.F.R. Sect. 51.309(a).

1 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION WITH RESPECT TO ISSUE 18?**

2 A. The Commission should adopt Level 3's position and delete Ameritech's
3 proposed language that does not comport with current law and which
4 would impair the ability of Level 3 to offer services.

5


6 ***Issue 19 – Enhanced Extended Loops***

7

8 **Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN BRIEFLY WHAT AN ENHANCED EXTENDED**
9 **LINK (“EEL”) IS?**

10 A. An EEL is a combination of an unbundled loop and unbundled transport
11 obtained from the ILEC. Specifically, as the FCC notes in the Executive
12 Summary of the *UNE Remand Order*, page 12, “...an enhanced extended
13 link (EEL) consists of a combination of an unbundled loop,
14 multiplexing/concentrating equipment, and dedicated transport”. By
15 means of this loop/transport combination (the EEL), Level 3 can serve
16 customers with unbundled loops without having to collocate in the central
17 office from which the unbundled loops are provided. This situation is
18 illustrated in the diagram below:

19



Note that without the EEL, if Level 3 wanted to serve the customer depicted in the diagram above with an unbundled loop, Level 3 would have to collocate in both Ameritech central office CO1 and CO2; or, alternatively, Level 3 would have to build or lease transport facilities from its central office to CO1, out of which the customer is served.

Q. WHY IT IS IMPORTANT THAT LEVEL 3 BE ABLE TO SERVE CUSTOMERS, BY MEANS OF THE EEL, IN CENTRAL OFFICES WHERE LEVEL 3 IS NOT COLLOCATED?

A. It is important that CLECs, such as Level 3, be allowed to serve customers throughout the local exchange by the most efficient and economical means possible. This is important both from a marketing perspective, as well as from an economic viability perspective. Naturally, it is also important to consumers who are looking for competitive alternatives to Ameritech service.

1 From an overall business perspective, it is important that customers can
2 be served in a manner that is economically viable. Absent the EEL, the
3 CLEC would almost certainly be required to collocate in every central
4 office where it orders unbundled loops. Given the significant up-front
5 expenses associated with collocation, this would greatly increase the cost
6 per customer, not to mention the effect such a requirement would have on
7 the relatively finite nature of available collocation space, most likely driving
8 the cost-benefit analysis of serving such customers into the red. In
9 addition, it is important to remember that the EEL is an effective and cost-
10 efficient method by which to serve customers not necessarily served by
11 the CLEC's network. In short, the EEL is more efficient than requiring
12 CLECs to collocate in every central office within which they would like to
13 serve customers.


14
15 Most importantly, CLECs need to be able to expeditiously acquire a critical
16 mass of customers necessary to realize economies of scale resulting from
17 using the capacity of their networks. Telecommunications equipment such
18 as switches need to serve a minimum number of customers before they
19 can be operated efficiently. If the CLECs are unable to attain a customer
20 base that utilizes the capacity of these switches efficiently, their *per*
21 *customer* costs will be significantly higher than those of the ILECs, who
22 tend to run their facilities at relatively higher levels of utilization. The same
23 is true for many other components of their networks. In sum, CLECs are

1 in a race against time to acquire, as quickly as possible, customers and
2 increase the utilization of their networks.

3

4 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN IN MORE DETAIL HOW USE OF THE EEL HELPS**
5 **LEVEL 3 ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY CUSTOMER BASE TO**
6 **OPERATE EFFICIENTLY.**

7 A. The diagram below shows how, by means of the EEL, Level 3 can offer
8 service across a large geographic region without establishing numerous,
9 expensive collocations within Ameritech's central offices (and taking up
10 valuable collocation space that is unnecessary to provision the service
11 Level 3 requests). In this diagram, Level 3 isn't collocated in any
12 Ameritech wire center, yet it is able to serve customers in four of
13 Ameritech's wire centers on a facilities basis. The diagram below shows
14 how Level 3 can, through the combination of unbundled loops (dotted
15 lines) and unbundled local transport (solid lines)—all purchased from
16 Ameritech—access all the local customers located in four separate
17 Ameritech central offices:



Q. IS THE EEL FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT TO A SPECIAL ACCESS CIRCUIT?

A. In many regards, yes. Both the EEL and special access circuits provide for a loop/transport combination that establishes a transmission path from a customer premises to a distant central office by routing the circuit through an intermediate central office. Existing special access circuits, therefore, are prime candidates to be converted to EELs, because by all technical definitions, special access circuits are nothing more than an existing combination of unbundled network elements (an unbundled loop, a cross-connect—possibly multiplexing—and unbundled interoffice transport).

**Q. DID THE FCC FIND THAT ILECS SHOULD MAKE THE EEL
AVAILABLE TO REQUESTING CLECS?**

A. Yes, at least where such combinations are in existing form today. In
paragraph 486 of the *UNE Remand Order*, the FCC found that

As an initial matter, under existing law, a requesting carrier is
*entitled to obtain existing combinations of loop and transport
between the end user and the incumbent LECs serving wire
center on an unrestricted basis at unbundled network
element prices.* In particular, any requesting carrier that is
collocated in a serving wire center is free to order loops and
transport to that serving wire center as unbundled network
elements because those elements meet the unbundling
standard, as discussed above. Moreover, to the extent those
unbundled network elements are already combined as a
special access circuit, the incumbent may not separate them
under rule 51.315(b), which was reinstated by the Supreme
Court. In such situations, it would be impermissible for an
incumbent LEC to require that a requesting carrier provide a
certain amount of local service over such facilities.
[Emphasis added; Footnotes Deleted]

The FCC also ruled in paragraph 480 that:

Thus, although in this Order, we neither define the EEL as a
separate unbundled network element nor interpret rule
51.315(b) as requiring incumbents to combine unbundled
network elements that are "ordinarily combined," we note
that in specific circumstances, the incumbent is presently
obligated to provide access to the EEL. In particular, the
incumbent LECs may not separate loop and transport
elements that are currently combined and purchased
through the special access tariffs. Moreover, requesting
carriers are entitled to obtain such existing loop-transport
combinations at unbundled network element prices.
(Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)

**Q. IN GENERAL, DID THE FCC FIND THAT NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IN
ORDER AND THAT UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE LOOP NETWORK**

1 **IS, IN FACT, ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE PROCOMPETITIVE**
2 **PROVISIONS OF THE ACT OF 1996?**

3 A. Yes. At paragraph 177 of the UNE Remand Order, the FCC found the
4 following:

5 For similar reasons, we reject US West's argument that we
6 should *exclude* from the definition the loop facilities that
7 underlie *private line and special access* interconnection,
8 because providing these services to competitors at lower-
9 than-tariffed rates would "promote regulatory arbitrage and
10 serve no valid statutory or public purpose."³²⁸ The
11 Commission has not previously found that the requirements
12 of section 251(c)(3) are limited to any particular kind of
13 service.³²⁹ Moreover, section 251(d)(2) of the Act refers to a
14 "... carrier seeking access to provide the *services that it*
15 ~~*seeks to offer.*~~" *We find no basis for placing a restriction on*
16 *what services a carrier may offer using the loop network*
17 *element. Indeed, the prospect of competition among carriers*
18 *to provide services over the loop at prices that more closely*
19 *reflect the provider's costs seems to us to accord fully with*
20 *Congress's intent in passing the 1996 Act. We do not now*
21 *decide whether or not this analysis may extend to the*
22 *enhanced extended loop (EEL), but rather seek comment on*
23 *that issue in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,*
24 *below.*³³¹ (Emphasis added.)
25

26 Thus, the FCC supported the general proposition that "...the prospect of
27 competition among carriers to provide services over the loop at prices that
28 more closely reflect the provider's costs ... accord[s] fully with Congress'
29 intent in passing the 1996 Act." While the FCC has requested further
30 comments on the extent to which this analysis should be extended to the
31 EEL, the FCC's preliminary analysis would exclude limits on the uses for
32 unbundled network elements. Likewise, it would preclude restrictions that
33 were not based upon either technological or public policy concerns. I

1 would encourage the Illinois Commission to reach a similar finding and
2 reject Ameritech's unfounded restrictions.

3 **Q. HAS THE FCC RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EEL IN THE**
4 **FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPETITION BY**
5 **LOWERING THE COST OF COLLOCATION?**

6 A. Yes. In paragraph 288 of the *UNE Remand Order*, the FCC notes the
7 following:

8
9 As noted in section VI(B) above, the EEL allows requesting
10 carriers to serve a customer by extending a customer's loop
11 from the end office serving that customer to a different end
12 office in which the competitor is already collocated. The EEL
13 therefore allows requesting carriers to aggregate loops at
14 fewer collocation locations and increase their efficiencies by
15 transporting aggregated loops over efficient-high capacity
16 facilities to their central switching location. Thus, the cost of
17 collocation can be diminished through the use of the EEL.
18 *We agree with ALTS that, if requesting carriers can obtain*
19 *nondiscriminatory, cost-based access to the enhanced*
20 *extended link, their collocation costs would decrease, and*
21 *they would need to collocate in as few as one incumbent*
22 *LEC central office in an MSA to provide service.* [Emphasis
23 added, footnote omitted.]
24
25

26 **Q. HAS AMERITECH AGREED TO MAKE THE EEL AVAILABLE ON AN**
27 **UNRESTRICTED BASIS?**

28 A. It has not. Ameritech has agreed to offer the EEL, but has so limited the
29 availability of the EEL so as to make it nearly impossible to order.

30 Specifically, I have attached as TJG Schedule 3 a copy of Ameritech's
31 proposed self-certification for the reconfiguration of special access circuits

1 into EELs. In short, I understand that Ameritech is imposing the following
2 restrictions on provision of the EEL with respect to the conversion of
3 *special access circuits*:

- 4
5 1) The special access circuit in question must contain substantial local
6 exchange traffic. The term substantial, as interpreted by
7 Ameritech, requires that Level 3 must: (i) be the exclusive provider
8 of local exchange service for a customer; (ii) provide at least 1/3 of
9 the customers' local exchange service, and at least 50% of the
10 circuits included in an EEL must have at least 5% of local voice
11 traffic, and the entire DS1 facility must have at least 10% local
12 voice traffic, and each of the individual circuits as multiplexed
13 meets these criteria; or (iii) at least 50% of the traffic on at least
14 50% of the channels on the loop portion is local voice traffic, and
15 the entire circuit has at least 33% local voice traffic, and each of the
16 individual circuits as multiplexed meets these criteria.
17
- 18 2) Any circuit that is converted must terminate in a collocation space.
19
- 20 3) According to page 1 of the Ameritech document, Level 3 must
21 specifically acknowledge by signing that "Internet traffic is interstate
22 and non local in nature."
23
- 24 4) Level 3 must pay any applicable termination charges for the special
25 access circuits that may be terminated early in order to convert.
26
- 27 5) Level 3 must pay any service order and administrative charges
28 associated with the conversion of special access circuits to UNEs.
29
30

31 **Q. IS IT APPROPRIATE FOR AMERITECH TO IMPOSE A MULTITUDE OF**
32 **RESTRICTIONS ON LEVEL 3'S USE OF EELS?**

33 A. No. Ameritech's proposed restrictions suffer from two major flaws. First,
34 none of these restrictions are based upon a technological or valid public
35 policy concern. Instead, they are transparently aimed at protecting the
36 extent to which Level 3 can use the EEL to compete with Ameritech.

1 Second, none of the restrictions above are allowed by the FCC's UNE
2 Remand Order. For example, there is no need to require certification
3 under the auspices of the Interconnection Agreement that mandate a
4 **specified percentage** of local **voice** traffic that needs to be transmitted
5 over a special access circuit before it can be converted to an EEL. The
6 FCC in its *UNE Remand Supplemental Order*⁸, at paragraphs 4 and 5,
7 provided the proper standard to be used in determining whether a special
8 access circuit could be converted to an EEL.

9 4. We now conclude that, until resolution of our Fourth
10 FNPRM, which will occur on or before June 30, 2000, IXC's
11 ~~may not~~ convert special access services to combinations of
12 unbundled loops and transport network elements, whether or
13 not the IXC's self-provide entrance facilities (or obtain them
14 from third parties). This will give us sufficient time to issue
15 an order addressing the Fourth FNPRM.

16
17 5. This constraint does not apply if an IXC uses
18 combinations of unbundled loop and transport network
19 elements to provide a significant amount of local exchange
20 service, in addition to exchange access service, to a
21 particular customer.⁹

22
23 ⁹ ...In addition, we will presume that the requesting carrier is providing
24 significant local exchange service if the requesting carrier is providing all
25 of the end user's local exchange service. Because we intend the
26 constraint we identify in this Order to be limited in duration, we do not
27 find it necessary for incumbent LECs and requesting carriers to
28 undertake auditing processes to monitor whether or not requesting
29 carriers are using unbundled network elements solely to provide
30 exchange access service. We expect that allowing requesting carriers to
31 self-certify that they are providing a significant amount of local exchange
32 service over combinations of unbundled loops and transport network
33 elements will not delay their ability to convert these facilities to
34 unbundled network element pricing, and we will take swift enforcement
35 action if we become aware that any incumbent LEC is unreasonably
36 delaying the ability of a requesting carrier to make such conversions.
37

⁸ In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, *UNE Remand Supplemental Order*, CC Docket No. 96-98, Released November 24, 1999.

1 As is evidenced by the FCC's discussion above, a requesting carrier is
2 required only to "self-certify" that it is providing "...a significant amount of
3 local exchange service" over the special access circuit in order to be
4 eligible to convert the circuit to a combination of unbundled network
5 elements. The numerical and technical parameters included in
6 Ameritech's limitations are obviously contrary to the above stated "self-
7 certification" process whereby the FCC obviously left the requesting
8 carrier in charge of certifying that it had met the FCC's standard of
9 "significant local traffic," without reference to specific percentages or the
10 content of traffic (i.e., voice or data).

11
12 **Q. DID NOT THE FCC SUGGEST LOCAL TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS**
13 **SIMILAR TO THOSE AMERITECH IS IMPOSING?**

14 A. Yes. The FCC has indicated through a footnote reference to a filing by
15 certain carriers that it might consider local traffic percentage restrictions
16 similar to Ameritech's to meet the "significant" local service requirement.
17 However, it is important to note that the FCC has not actually moved to
18 adopt these percentages as of the date of this testimony even though they
19 have been under consideration for several months. Nor has Ameritech
20 shown any reason why "voice" traffic is somehow more local than data
21 traffic in calls delivered to ISPs for the purposes of considering what
22 constitutes "significant local traffic."

1 There is no proven need in Illinois for Ameritech to maintain special
2 access rates at higher than competitive prices for purposes of subsidizing
3 some universal service objective. Hence, there is no need for the Illinois
4 Commission to place overly strict limitations on the extent to which CLECs
5 can convert special access circuits to EELs. For this reason, I would
6 recommend that the Illinois Commission take a very broad view of the
7 term "significant" as it is used for purposes of limiting the extent to which
8 Level 3 can convert special access circuits to combinations of UNEs
9 (EELs). Therefore, I would likewise recommend that the Commission
10 reject Ameritech's attempt to quantify the term "significant" in a manner
11 that would overly limit Level 3's access to the EEL.

12
13 **Q. PLEASE COMMENT FURTHER REGARDING AMERITECH'S**
14 **REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO INTERNET TRAFFIC AND THE**
15 **FACT THAT THE LOCAL TRAFFIC MUST ALSO BE "VOICE" TRAFFIC**
16 **TO QUALIFY FOR CONVERSION OF A SPECIAL ACCESS CIRCUIT.**

17 A. Ameritech has provided no reason to tie the use of the EEL to some
18 acknowledgement by Level 3 in a self-certification as to the jurisdictional
19 nature of certain types of traffic. In short, Ameritech is offering Level 3
20 access to the EEL (a combination of elements to which Level 3 is already
21 entitled), only if Level 3 agrees to exclude a component of "local traffic"
22 from the definition of local traffic for certification purposes. Level 3's

1 position on compensation for ISP-bound traffic should not be a condition
2 of receiving the EEL.

3
4 Further, in the recent arbitration award in Docket No. 00-0027, the Illinois
5 Commission already determined that Internet traffic is local traffic for
6 purposes of EEL conversion:

7 Based upon the record before us, we must agree with Focal
8 that, for purposes of complying with the FCC's directive in
9 the Supplemental Order, Focal should be allowed to count
10 ISP bound traffic as local exchange service in self certifying
11 that it will be providing a significant level of local exchange
12 service through an EEL. [Arbitration Decision in 00-0027 at
13 page 15.]
14

15 Ameritech has provided no sound reason for the Commission to depart
16 from its ruling only a matter of weeks ago on this same question.

17 **Q. PLEASE COMMENT REGARDING AMERITECH'S CONTENTION THAT**
18 **LEVEL 3 MUST PAY ANY APPLICABLE TERMINATION CHARGES**
19 **FOR THE SPECIAL ACCESS CIRCUITS THAT MAY BE TERMINATED**
20 **EARLY IN ORDER TO CONVERT.**

21 A. Termination charges and other non-recurring charges should not be
22 automatically applied as a matter of course when special access circuits
23 are converted to EELs. Rather, the applicability of such charges should
24 be determined based on the recognition that the underlying network
25 configuration remains the same and that it concerns only an *administrative*
26 change in prices. To my knowledge, Ameritech's current termination or

1 service order charges do not apply to such an administrative change in
2 prices. Instead, Ameritech's non-recurring charges, almost without
3 exception, include costs associated with technicians manipulating the
4 network for purposes of providing the service requested. Because Level 3
5 will be simply "redefining" the service in question when converting a
6 special access circuit to an EEL (*i.e.*, from a special access service to a
7 combination of UNEs), it will be unnecessary for Ameritech's technicians
8 to alter the network at all. As such, many non-recurring charges would be
9 inappropriate and would serve to recover again, expenses already
10 recovered when Level 3 originally established the circuit as a special
11 access service.

12
13 **Q. WHAT POSSIBLE REASON COULD AMERITECH HAVE FOR ITS**
14 **PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS?**

15 A. A review of the above restrictions reveals that they are simply aimed at
16 preserving Ameritech's revenue stream by handicapping Level 3 in its
17 potential use of EELs. The preservation of Ameritech's existing revenue
18 stream at the expense of local exchange competition, however, is no
19 longer a valid policy objective. Therefore, the Commission should reject
20 Ameritech's proposed restrictions and allow Level 3 to convert special
21 access circuits to combinations of unbundled network elements. The only
22 limitation that should be applied to Level 3's converting special access
23 services to a combination of UNEs (*i.e.*, an EEL), is the limitation included

1 by the FCC in its UNE Remand Supplemental Order. That is, Level 3
2 should be allowed to convert special access circuits to EELs wherever
3 Level 3 can self-certify that the EEL will be used to provide a "significant
4 amount of local exchange service."

5

6 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION ON ENHANCED EXTENDED**
7 **LOOPS.**

8 A. The availability of EELs allows CLECs to serve customers throughout the
9 local exchange in an economic and efficient manner. Without EELs
10 CLECs would be required to collocate in every central office where it
11 orders unbundled loops. The use of EELs avoids expensive and time
12 consuming collocations and allows Level 3 and other CLECs to quickly
13 provide service across a much larger service territory than would be
14 possible otherwise, thereby providing a competitive alternative to
15 consumers.

16

17 As the FCC noted, CLECs are "...entitled to obtain existing combinations
18 of loop and transport between the end user and the incumbent LEC's
19 serving wire center on an unrestricted basis at unbundled network element
20 prices." Ameritech has proposed inappropriate restrictions on the
21 availability of EELs under the guise of a "self-certification." The
22 restrictions would restrict competition and alternatives to consumers. The
23 Commission should require Ameritech to remove the restrictions from its

1 self-certification, as they are not based on any technical or valid public
2 policy positions.

3

4 Finally, Ameritech should not be allowed to extract concessions from
5 CLECs as a quid pro quo for the availability of EELs. Specifically, as the
6 Commission found in the Focal arbitration, Level 3 should not be forced to
7 agree with Ameritech through a self-certification that data traffic is not
8 local exchange traffic in order to receive access to EELs. This
9 Commission has already determined that ISP-bound traffic is local
10 exchange-service. This position is consistent with Level 3's position and
11 the orders from the FCC.

12 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

13 A. Yes, it does.

Qualifications of Timothy J Gates
TJG Schedule 1

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.

- A. Prior to my current position with QSI Consulting, I was a Senior Executive Staff Member in MCI WorldCom's ("MCIW") National Public Policy Group. In this position, I was responsible for providing public policy expertise in key cases across the country and for managing external consultants for MCIW's state public policy organization. In certain situations, I also provided testimony in regulatory and legislative proceedings.

Prior to my position with MCIW in Denver, I was an Executive Staff Member II at MCI Telecommunications ("MCT") World Headquarters in Washington D.C.. In that position I managed economists, external consultants, and provided training and policy support for regional regulatory staffs. Prior to that position I was a Senior Manager in MCI's Regulatory Analysis Department, which provided support in state regulatory and legislative matters to the various operating regions of MCI. In that position I was given responsibility for assigning resources from our group for state regulatory proceedings throughout the United States. At the same time, I prepared and presented testimony on various telecommunications issues before state regulatory and legislative bodies. I was also responsible for managing federal tariff reviews and presenting MCI's position on regulatory matters to the Federal Communications Commission. Prior to my assignment in the Regulatory Analysis Department, I was the Senior Manager of Economic Analysis and Regulatory Policy in the Legal, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs Department for the Midwest Division of MCI. In that position I developed and promoted regulatory policy within what was then a five-state operating division of MCI. I promoted MCI policy positions through negotiations, testimony and participation in industry forums.

Prior to my positions in the Midwest, I was employed as Manager of Tariffs and Economic Analysis with MCI's West Division in Denver, Colorado. In that position I was responsible for managing the development and application of MCI's tariffs in the fifteen MCI West states. I was also responsible for managing regulatory dockets and for providing economic and financial expertise in the areas of discovery and issue analysis. Prior to joining the West Division, I was a Financial Analyst III and then a Senior Staff Specialist with MCI's Southwest Division in Austin, Texas. In those positions, I was responsible for the management of regulatory dockets and liaison with outside counsel. I was also responsible for discovery, issue analysis, and for the development of working relationships with consumer and business groups. Just prior to joining MCI, I was employed by the Texas Public Utility Commission as a Telephone Rate Analyst in the Engineering Division responsible for examining telecommunications cost studies and rate structures.

I was employed as an Economic Analyst with the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon from July, 1983 to December, 1984. In that position, I examined and analyzed cost studies and rate structures in telecommunications rate cases and investigations. I also testified in rate cases and in private and public hearings regarding telecommunications services. Before joining the Oregon Commissioner's Staff, I was employed by the Bonneville Power Administration as a Financial Analyst, where I made total regional electric use forecasts and automated the Average System Cost Review Methodology. Prior to joining the Bonneville Power Administration, I held numerous positions of increasing responsibility in areas of forest management for both public and private forestry concerns.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL CREDENTIALS.

- A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree from Oregon State University and a Master of Management degree in Finance and Quantitative Methods from Willamette University's Atkinson Graduate School of Management. I have also attended numerous courses and seminars specific to the telecommunications industry, including the NARUC Annual Regulatory Studies Program.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES?

- A. Effective April 1, 2000, I joined QSI Consulting as Vice President and Partner. In this position I provide analysis and testimony for QSI's many clients. The deliverables include written and oral testimony,

analysis of rates, cost studies and policy positions, position papers, presentations on industry issues and training.

Q. PLEASE IDENTIFY THE JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU HAVE TESTIFIED.

A. I have filed testimony or comments on telecommunications issues in Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. I have also filed comments with the FCC and made presentations to the Department of Justice.

I have testified or presented formal comments in the following proceedings and forums:

Arizona:

September 23, 1987; Arizona Corporation Commission Workshop on Special Access Services; Comments on Behalf of MCI.

August 21, 1996; Affidavit in Opposition to USWC Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; No. CV 95-14284, No. CV-96-03355, No. CV-96-03356, (consolidated); On Behalf of MCI.

October 24, 1997; Comments to the Universal Service Fund Working Group; Docket No. R-0000-97-137; On Behalf of MCI.

May 8, 1998; Comments to the Universal Service Fund Working Group; Docket No. R-0000-97-137; On Behalf of MCI.

November 9, 1998; Docket No. T-03175A-97-0251; Application of MCImetro Access Transmission Services, Inc. to Expand It's CCN to Provide IntraLATA Services and to Determine that Its IntraLATA Services are Competitive; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

September 20, 1999; Docket No. T-00000B-97-238; USWC OSS Workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCI WorldCom, Inc.

California:

August 30, 1996; Application No. 96-08-068; MCI Petition for Arbitration with Pacific Bell; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 10, 1996; Application No. 96-09-012; MCI Petition for Arbitration with GTE California, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Colorado:

December 1, 1986; Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 1720; Rate Case of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 26, 1988; Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 1766; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company's Local Calling Access Plan; Direct Testimony of Behalf of MCI.

September 6, 1996; MCImetro Petition for Arbitration wit U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Docket No. 96A-366T (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 17, 1996; MCImetro Petition for Arbitration wit U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Docket No. 96A-366T (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 26, 1996; Application of U S WEST Communications, Inc. To Modify Its Rate and Service Regulation Plan; Docket No. 90A-665T (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 7, 1996; Application of U S WEST Communications, Inc. To Modify Its Rate and Service Regulation Plan; Docket No. 90A-665T (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 18, 1997; Complaint of MCI to Reduce USWC Access Charges to Economic Cost; Docket Nos. 97K-237T, 97F-175T (consolidated) and 97F-212T (consolidated); Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

August 15, 1997; Complaint of MCI to Reduce USWC Access Charges to Economic Cost; Docket Nos. 97K-237T, 97F-175T (consolidated) and 97F-212T (consolidated); Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

March 10, 1998; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI to WorldCom, Inc.; Docket No. 97A-494T; Supplemental Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

March 26, 1998; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI to WorldCom, Inc.; Docket No. 97A-494T; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 8, 1998; Application of WorldCom, Inc. for Approval to Transfer Control of MCI to WorldCom, Inc.; Docket No. 97A-494T; Affidavit in Response to GTE.

November 4, 1998; Proposed Amendments to the Rules Prescribing IntraLATA Equal Access; Docket No. 98R-426T; Comments to the Commission on Behalf of MCI WorldCom and AT&T Communications of the Mountain-States, Inc.

May 13, 1999; Proposed Amendments to the Rules on Local Calling Area Standards; Docket No. 99R-128T; Oral Comments before the Commissioners on Behalf of MCIW.

Delaware:

February 12, 1993; Diamond State Telephone Company's Application for a Rate Increase; Docket No. 92-47; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Florida:

July 1, 1994; Investigation into IntraLATA Presubscription; Docket No. 930330-TP; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Idaho:

November 20, 1987; Case No. U_1150_1; Petition of MCI for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

March 17, 1988; Case No. U_1500_177; Investigation of the Universal Local Access Service Tariff; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 26, 1988; Case No. U_1500_177; Investigation of the Universal Local Access Service Tariff; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Illinois:

January 16, 1989; Docket No. 83_0142; Appropriate Methodology for Intrastate Access Charges; Rebuttal Testimony Regarding Toll Access Denial on Behalf of MCI.

February 16, 1989; Docket No. 83_0142; Appropriate Methodology for Intrastate Access Charges; Testimony Regarding ICTC's Access Charge Proposal on Behalf of MCI.

May 3, 1989; Docket No. 89_0033; Illinois Bell Telephone Company's Rate Restructuring; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

July 14, 1989; Docket No. 89-0033; Illinois Bell Telephone Company's Rate Restructuring; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 22, 1989; Docket No. 88-0091; IntraMSA Dialing Arrangements; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

February 9, 1990; Docket No. 88-0091; IntraMSA Dialing Arrangements; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

November 19, 1990; Docket No. 83-0142; Industry presentation to the Commission re Docket No. 83-0142 and issues for next generic access docket; Comments re the Imputation Trial and Unitary Pricing/Building Blocks on Behalf of MCI.

July 29, 1991; Case No. 90-0425; Presentation to the Industry Regarding MCI's Position on Imputation.

November 18, 1993; Docket No. 93-0044; Complaint of MCI and LDDS re Illinois Bell Additional Aggregated Discount and Growth Incentive Discount Services; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI and LDDS.

January 10, 1994; Docket No. 93-0044; Complaint of MCI and LDDS re Illinois Bell Additional Aggregated Discount and Growth Incentive Discount Services; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI and LDDS.

Indiana:

October 28, 1988; Cause No. 38561; Deregulation of Customer Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone Companies; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 16, 1988; Cause No. 38561; Deregulation of Customer Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone Companies; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI Regarding GTE.

April 14, 1989; Cause No. 38561; Deregulation of Customer Specific Offerings of Indiana Telephone Companies; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI Regarding Staff Reports.

June 21, 1989; Cause No. 37905; Intrastate Access Tariffs -- Parity with Federal Rates; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 29, 1989; Cause No. 38560; Reseller Complaint Regarding 1+ IntraLATA Calling; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 25, 1990; Cause No. 39032; MCI Request for IntraLATA Authority; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

April 4, 1991; Rebuttal Testimony in Cause No. 39032 re MCI's Request for IntraLATA Authority on Behalf of MCI.

Iowa:

September 1, 1988; Docket No. RPU 88_6; IntraLATA Competition in Iowa; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 20, 1988; Docket No. RPU_88_1; Regarding the Access Charges of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 25, 1991; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

October 3, 1991; Docket No. NOI-90-1; Presentation on Imputation of Access Charges and the Other Costs of Providing Toll Services; On Behalf of MCI.

November 5, 1991; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

December 23, 1991; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of US WEST Communications, Inc.; Supplemental Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 10, 1992; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 20, 1992; Docket No. RPU-91-4; Investigation of the Earnings of U S WEST Communications, Inc.; Surrebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 8, 1999; Docket NOI-99-1; Universal Service Workshop; Participated on numerous panels during two day workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCIW.

October 27, 1999; Docket NOI-99-1; Universal Service Workshop; Responded to questions posed by the Staff of the Board during one day workshop; Comments on Behalf of MCIW and AT&T.

Kansas:

June 10, 1992; Docket No. 181,097-U; General Investigation into IntraLATA Competition within the State

of Kansas; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

September 16, 1992; Docket No. 181,097-U; General Investigation into IntraLATA Competition within the State of Kansas; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Kentucky:

May 20, 1993; Administrative Case No. 323, Phase I; An Inquiry into IntraLATA Toll Competition, an Appropriate Compensation Scheme for Completion of IntraLATA Calls by Interexchange Carriers, and WATS Jurisdictionality; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Maryland:

November 12, 1993; Case No. 8585; Competitive Safeguards Required re C&P's Centrex Extend Service; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

January 14, 1994; Case No. 8585; Competitive Safeguards Required re C&P's Centrex Extend Service; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 19, 1994; Case No. 8585; Re Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc.'s Transmittal No. 878; Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

June 2, 1994; Case No. 8585; Competitive Safeguards Required re C&P's Centrex Extend Service; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Massachusetts:

April 22, 1993; D.P.U. 93-45; New England Telephone Implementation of Interchangeable NPAs; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

May 10, 1993; D.P.U. 93-45; New England Telephone Implementation of Interchangeable NPAs; Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of MCI.

Michigan:

September 29, 1988; Case Nos. U_9004, U_9006, U_9007 (Consolidated); Industry Framework for IntraLATA Toll Competition; Direct Testimony on Behalf of MCI.